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ABSTRACT 
 
Baeyens et al. (1998) claim that Field and Davey’s (1997) controversial study of conceptual 
conditioning offers little threat to current conceptions of evaluative conditioning. This article 
addresses some of the questions posed by Baeyens et al. First, some criticisms of the conceptual 
conditioning study appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the procedure. Second, we address 
the issues surrounding the so-called Type X procedure. Specifically, we begin by reviewing the 
status of studies that have used a different procedure to the Type X procedure. It is then argued that, 
although the Type X procedure has been used in only a portion of EC research, it has been used 
primarily in those studies whose outcome has been used to argue that evaluative conditioning (EC) 
is functionally distinct from autonomic conditioning. We then review the evidence from non-Type 
X procedures that EC is a distinct form of learning. Finally, an attempt is made to explain why 
between-subject controls should be used as a matter of course in this field of research. 
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The Conceptual Conditioning Experiment 
Baeyens et al. (1998) critique our conceptual conditioning experiment (Field and Davey, 1997) on 
two related counts: (1) that the paradigm is not comparable to past EC research because the 
subjective neutrality of the CSs was not established on a per-subject basis, and (2) that the results in 
the no-treatment condition therefore represent the subjective neutrality of these stimuli and hence 
demonstrate that the results in the paired condition are also nothing more than baseline ratings of 
the neutrality of the CSs. 
Although we can accept that the description of the procedure in the original paper lacked clarity 
regarding the issue of assessing the neutrality of the CSs, the results clearly talk of shifts in CS 
ratings (as does Figure 2, Field and Davey, 1997, p 456). In fact, the procedure used was designed 
to be a faithful analogue of the Type X procedure described by Baeyens et al. and, therefore, a dual 
hierarchy was used whereby the subjective neutrality of the CS was first established through 
subjects rating these faces at zero on the conceptual rating scale and only then was a UCS assigned 
to it. As a tangential point, Baeyens et al. note a confound in the pairing procedure such that 
pairings with specific levels of feature overlap necessarily have to be paired with certain types of 
UCS (see footnote 1 in Baeyens et al., 1998). Although they admit that this point is ‘largely 
irrelevant to the gist of our argument’ (p. x) they still believe that it is important enough to warrant 
inclusion. It is a valid criticism that this bias would confound any effects of the number of 
overlapping features, and as Baeyens et al. note the presence of effects in the two control conditions 
makes the issue largely irrelevant. However, it is worth noting that the bias identified by Field and 
Davey occurred only in situations where a CS had been consistently selected to be paired with a 
UCS of a certain type (be that Martian or Venusian). So, conditioning-type effects were elicited 
when CSs were always paired with a UCS of a certain valence regardless of whether the two stimuli 
had one, two, or three features in common. Crucially, this means that the biases found to lead to 
conditioning-type effects were not influenced by the confound identified by Baeyens et al. 
Baeyens et al. also suggest that the results from the no-treatment condition support their 
interpretation of the biases within the conceptual conditioning paradigm (pxxx).  They claim that 
because the pattern of results in the nonpaired and no treatment conditions was identical to that in 
the paired condition, then this confirms their belief that the CSs were not “idiosyncratically neutral 
CSs from the very start of the experiment”. However, the fact that the pattern of results was 
identical across all three conditions could be taken as support for any number of hypotheses. 
Because studies using the Type X procedure have never before used between-subject control 
conditions (with the exception of Shanks & Dickinson, 1990), then it is equally legitimate to use the 
similarity of findings across experimental and control groups to argue that EC in the Type X 
procedure is not associative in nature. It is worth noting that the only other study to have used a 
between-subject control condition with the Type X procedure found similar results to Field & 
Davey (1997) - that the nonpaired control condition exhibited EC-like effects similar to those found 
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in the paired condition (Shanks & Dickinson, 1990). It is also worth emphasising that the Shanks & 
Dickinson procedure used faces as stimuli in the standard Type X EC paradigm. 
The Type X Procedure 
Field and Davey (1997) have suggested that a particular paradigm (labelled the Type X procedure 
by Baeyens et al.) may be prone to artefacts that lead to conditioning-type effects. The reason why 
this particular paradigm is problematic is because it fails to control for nonassociative effects. To 
control for nonassociative effects Shanks and Dickinson (1990) have argued that the pairing of a 
particular CS with a particular UCS needs to be counterbalanced across subjects. The Type X 
procedure fails to meet this criterion because pairings are dependent on both the subjects’ original 
evaluations, and, in some cases, the experimenter matching CSs and UCSs on the basis of 
perceptual similarity. Without this counterbalancing, it is possible that opposite shifts between the 
ratings of CSs paired with liked UCSs and those paired with disliked UCSs are due to differential 
effects of repeated exposure on stimuli selected to be paired with liked, disliked or neutral UCSs. 
So, it cannot be ruled out that it is the specific features of the CSs that cause the observed shifts, 
rather than the pairing process. 
Although we believe that the criticisms aimed at the conceptual conditioning paradigm are 
unfounded, Baeyens et al. still offer several other arguments for why Field and Davey’s (1997) 
results pose little threat to the existence of EC. The crux of their defence is that the conceptual 
conditioning paradigm is an analogue of only an atypical experimental paradigm (the Type X 
procedure); as such, findings from it have no general applicability. Furthermore, they list several 
studies, which have used a different paradigm, that they believe show irrefutable evidence of 
genuine associative learning. In this section, a review is made of the non-Type X EC studies. From 
this review we hope to show that there is little unequivocal evidence to suggest that EC exists as a 
distinct form of associative learning. Furthermore, we hope to show that although the Type X 
procedure is not the only procedure used in EC research, it is by far the most important. 
Is there evidence for EC when a Type X procedure is not used? 
Baeyens et al. report that ‘In several labs, EC has proven to be a quite robust and ecologically valid 
phenomenon, showing up in highly divergent conditioning preparations’ but that ‘the boundary 
conditions of EC are not yet clearly understood, such that both conceptual and exact replications 
sometimes result in unexpected failures’ (p. xx). Although it is true that EC-type effects have been 
shown in several labs, we question whether these effects have been adequately shown to result from 
associations between a CS and its paired UCS. Furthermore, the functional characteristics of EC, 
which allegedly distinguish it from autonomic Pavlovian learning, have been systematically tested 
largely in only one paradigm — the Type X procedure. The researchers who worked most 
prominently in this area have had undoubtedly different experiences. Levey and Martin, who 
pioneered this work, conducted 16 experiments that show a clear pattern of establishing EC effects 
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in conditions where the CS and UCS were matched on the basis of similarity (nine experiments), 
but such effects were not found, or were inconsistent, in conditions where a random allocation was 
used (eight experiments), or UCSs were selected to be dissimilar to the CSs (one experiment — see 
Martin and Levey, 1978; Levey and Martin, 1975, 1987 for details of these experiments). Baeyens 
and his colleagues have conducted many experiments into evaluative conditioning and have always 
found EC effects regardless of how UCSs are allocated to CSs and the procedure used (see Baeyens 
et al.’s article in this issue for a review of their work). Our own experiences have been that EC 
effects can be established but only when the CS and UCS are matched on the basis of similarity (see 
Field, 1997 and Field and Davey, 1997). Hammerl and Grabitz have consistently found EC effects 
using a random matching procedure, but it is noteworthy that they use a slightly different paradigm 
that does not utilise neutral-dislike pairings and so they have never shown evidence of 
discriminative learning between CSs paired with liked and disliked UCSs (see Hammerl and 
Grabitz, 1993, 1996). The final laboratory of note is Rozin’s and they have found EC effects in 
some instances (Todrank, Byrnes, Wrzesniewski & Rozin, 1995) but not in others (Rozin, 
Wrzesniewski & Byrnes, in press). So, in fact, EC has not proven to be robust in several labs, but 
instead is robust for some and elusive for others. Whenever a conditioning effect is elusive an 
important issue is not necessarily why some researchers have little trouble establishing EC effects 
while others struggle in vain, but whether the effects that have been shown reflect genuine 
associative learning. 
Baeyens et al. list several studies that have used CS-UCS pairings that have been either 
counterbalanced or randomly allocated (and hence should not be open to the criticisms raised by 
Field and Davey, 1997). These studies are cited as confirmatory evidence for the existence of EC as 
a form of associative learning (and a distinct form of learning at that), however, a closer inspection 
of many of the studies reveals that most of them still provide only equivocal evidence of associative 
learning. Although it seems a little churlish to make detailed critiques of these studies, it is 
necessary to mention some of the reasons why they might fail to convince some researchers that EC 
is associative in nature. 
Counterbalanced CS+/CS˜ paradigms are when half of the subjects receive a CS+ and a CS˜ 
stimulus paired with a liked and a disliked UCS respectively, whereas the other half receive the 
same CS+, CS˜ and UCSs, but with the UCSs paired with the opposite CS. Such a procedure 
necessarily rules out the type of bias discussed by Field and Davey (1997) which relies upon certain 
CSs being ‘prone’ to being consistently selected to be paired with a particular class of UCS. 
The proposition that significant CS+/CS˜ discriminations necessarily reflect associative learning 
can also be questioned through a research example. Gorn (1982) found differential preferences for 
coloured pens when they were paired with liked or disliked music. This study used a 
counterbalanced design and so did not rely on CS and UCS being matched by the experimenter. It 
utilised a design whereby subjects saw one colour of pen paired with either liked or disliked music 
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(between-subjects) and one pen that was not paired with anything (within-subjects). Presumably, 
Baeyens would accept that the results of this study necessarily reflect associative learning yet the 
results have subsequently been shown to be an artefact of the experimental situation whereby some 
subjects’ belief that the experiment was about consistency theory deliberately chose a pen that was 
consistent with the one they had seen in the slide when the music was played (Allen and Madden, 
1985; Darley & Lim, 1993). 
Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh and Crombez (1990b) reported significant differential shifts 
between CS flavours in positive or negative liquid compounds, but closer inspection of their data 
reveal that these differential effects were possibly due to changes in the control CS˜ stimulus to 
which the experimental stimuli were compared and were not due to actual differences between the 
test CSs (see Field & Davey, 1997). Baeyens et al. (this issue) defend the study by first suggesting 
that ‘due to the differential-anchoring problem, one simply cannot draw any definite conclusions as 
to whether it was the CS+, the CS˜, or both, which were affected’ (p. xxx). Our belief that it is only 
the CS+ evaluations that should be crucial to infer learning stems from the fact that EC is 
characterised as a means for stimuli to acquire affective value. If it cannot be shown that the CS+ 
acquired valence in its own right then the study tells us little about EC as a mechanism for acquiring 
likes and dislikes; it tells us only that in this kind of comparative situation one, or other, or both CSs 
will be rated comparatively differently, but not necessarily differently from a baseline of subjective 
affect. Second, Baeyens et al. (op. cit.) argue that the CS˜ ‘... is exactly the same stimulus as the 
CS+, presented equally often in the same context of the negative US, the only exception being that, 
unlike the CS+, the CS˜ could not enter into an association with the negative US ... Thus, 
differential responding to CS+ versus to CS- cannot but be ascribed to associative learning’ (p. 
xxx). In essence then, Baeyens et al.’s argument is that it is impossible to say whether it was the 
CS+ or the CS˜ that was affected, but this does not matter because it is the discrimination between 
the CS+ and CS˜ that allows us to infer associative learning. However, although it is true that the 
CS˜ does not enter into an association with the negative UCS, it is not true that it enters into no 
association whatsoever. In fact, Rescorla (1967) has argued that in this kind of discriminative 
paradigm, the CS˜ may come to predict the absence of the UCS. If we cannot be sure whether it is 
the CS+ or CS˜ that is affected, then equally we cannot be sure whether the discrimination between 
the CS+ and CS˜ is the result of a CS-UCS association, a CS-absence-of-UCS association, or an 
interaction of both. Baeyens et al. seem to imply that the association is irrelevant and that so long as 
some associations are made then the type of association is irrelevant. However, to infer that 
conditioning occurs because of CS-UCS associations (which is the implication in the EC literature) 
it is necessary to demonstrate that a CS is affected through being associated with a specific UCS. 
Without this knowledge we can say little about cause and effect. It can be concluded only that some 
associations exist within the paradigm, that the paradigm gives us certain results, but not that the 
associations necessarily cause the results. In addition, no baseline ratings of the CSs were taken in 
Baeyens et al.’s (1990b) study and so it is impossible to say whether associative learning occurred, 
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because there is little to say whether the subject’s opinion of the CS actually changed across 
conditioning. Presumably, the CS˜ is designed to act as a baseline for change in the CS+, however, 
it cannot act as a baseline for evaluation, and as a control for association unless it enters into no 
type of association whatsoever. 
Without knowledge of the specific associations involved, no firm conclusions can be drawn about 
whether the results reflect associative learning — simply because the effects might be dependent 
upon having a comparative situation where one stimulus predicts an outcome while another predicts 
the absence of that outcome. Baeyens et al. (this issue) agree with this idea (see page xxx) yet they 
believe that the exact nature of the associations is irrelevant, so long as we know that some 
associations are involved. This is a point that shall be considered in more depth in the section on 
control conditions. 
Baeyens, Crombez, Hendrickx and Eelen (1995a) also reported significant CS+/CS˜ discrimination 
learning when using flavours as stimuli. However, their data raise questions about the learning 
observed. When one flavour CS (pear) was used as a CS+ and a second flavour (apricot) was used 
as CS˜ the experimenters did observe significant differential responding: the pear flavour was rated 
more negatively than apricot (the CS+ was paired with a negative tasting liquid compound, while 
the CS˜ was paired with a neutral or slightly positive liquid compound). However, when the CS+ 
and CS˜ flavours were reversed (i.e. pear became the CS˜ and apricot became the CS+), the 
response profiles were similar: pear was still rated more negatively than apricot. This 
counterbalancing of flavours as CS+ and CS˜ is the factor that is crucial to rule out the possibility 
that the effects are due to a bias in the stimuli themselves. The results of this study indicate that the 
results were dependent on the type of flavour chosen to be CS+. In addition, they found reliable 
discriminations only between CS+ liquids and CS˜s presented in sugar (i.e. slightly positive), no 
significant discriminations were observed when water (a control liquid) was used as the compound 
liquid for the CS˜.  
One further study (Baeyens, Kaes, Eelen and Silvermans, 1996a) using counterbalanced CS-UCS 
allocation took no measure of evaluative change (i.e. no baseline measures were taken) and so does 
not conclusively demonstrate that the CSs acquired valence (because there is nothing to suggest that 
the CSs were originally neutral). In a final two experiments (Baeyens, Wrzesniewski, De Houwer 
and Eelen, 1996b) one showed only a nonsignificant conditioning effect whilst the other showed no 
differential EC effects between N-L and N-D pairings. However, this last study consisted of field 
experiments and so other uncontrolled factors could account for the failures to elicit EC effects. 
Bierley, McSweeney and Vannieuwkerk (1985) reported increased preferences for coloured shapes 
paired with positive music compared to a CS-only and random control condition. They had no 
shapes paired with negative music and so the paradigm looked only at positive affect. Also, no 
baseline measures were taken and so the results provide no evidence for changes in evaluation. 
Finally, although Bierley et al. compared CS+ (CS predicted Music)/CS˜ (CS did not predict music) 
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experimental conditions and found a significant difference, they did not compare the CS+ groups 
with both controls. They did compare the CS+ groups with the random control and found 
nonsignificant preferences for the CS+ compared to the control group, however they did find a 
significant decrease in preference for the CS˜ compared to the control group in one of two colour 
conditions. In short, contrary to its many citations as support for EC, closer reading of the paper 
shows little evidence for increased preferences compared to a random control presentations 
schedule. 
De Houwer, Hendrickx and Baeyens (1997) report two experiments where the CS and UCS were 
counterbalanced and one of these resulted in no EC effects whereas the other found significant 
conditioning effects. This latter experiment found conditioning in only one of the two word lists 
used (which was not theoretically expected), no measure of evaluative change was taken and so the 
subjective neutrality of the CSs were not established. More importantly, there was no significant 
overall effect of the valence of the UCS used (i.e. whether the UCS was a liked or disliked one), 
and CSs were given positive ratings (so, even when a disliked UCS was used the CSs were rated 
slightly positively). Therefore, this study provides fairly inconclusive evidence for differential 
transfer of affect when counterbalanced stimuli are used. 
To summarise the studies where counterbalancing of CS-UCS allocation has been used, there has 
been little unequivocal support for EC as a way of acquiring likes and dislikes through associative 
learning. 
A second deviation from the Type X procedure is when CSs and UCSs are not matched for 
perceptual similarity and Baeyens et al. list numerous studies that have used such a procedure and 
found apparently clear evidence for EC. Baeyens, Eelen, van den Bergh and Crombez (1992a) 
found evidence for conditioning and UCS revaluation, however, they did not measure CS ratings 
after conditioning — only after the whole procedure, which involved a revaluation and extinction 
procedure, was complete. Whilst a UCS-revaluation paradigm is accepted as a way of showing that 
associations have been formed, this is reliant on showing that the CS elicits a certain response after 
conditioning, but a different response after UCS-revaluation. The failure to take CS ratings after 
conditioning means that it is possible that the results are not association-based because there is 
nothing to suggest that CS ratings changed once after conditioning and then again once the UCS 
was revalued. It is possible that there could be a bias in the way in which CSs were allocated to a 
UCS that was revalued (or not). Baeyens, Hermans and Eelen (1993) utilised a random-matching 
procedure and found significant differential responding that was not mediated by CS-UCS 
contingency, however this study was one of two; the second, unpublished study, resulted in no EC 
effects. De Houwer, Baeyens and Eelen (1994) found significant EC effects when CSs and UCSs 
were randomly allocated; however, a replication of this study (De Houwer et al., 1997) failed to 
find EC in one experiment but not in another. In all of these experiments, no measures of evaluative 
change were taken and, although the differences between CSs paired with positive and negative 
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UCSs were significant, both sets of stimuli were rated positively (and so showed no evidence for 
affective transfer when a disliked UCS was used). So, these studies showed inconsistent evidence 
for EC effects, and the effects that were shown did not represent a change in evaluation. It is also 
worth reiterating that eight experiments reported by Martin and Levey (1978) and Levey and Martin 
(1987) found no EC effects, or questionable effects, when random CS-UCS allocation was used. 
Why the Type X Procedure is Important 
It is important to explain why the Type X procedure is crucial to these discussions regardless of 
whether it represents the typical EC paradigm or not. EC has been characterised as distinct from 
other forms of Pavlovian conditioning because of three key functional characteristics: it appears to 
happen in the absence of contingency awareness (Baeyens, Eelen and Van den Bergh, 1990a), it 
appears to be resistant to extinction (Baeyens, Crombez, Van den Bergh and Eelen, 1988; Baeyens, 
Eelen, Van den Bergh, and Crombez, 1989a), and it seems unreliant on CS-UCS contingency 
(Baeyens et al., 1993). These are important claims because they afford EC the status of a 
functionally different form of learning and also suggest that Pavlovian learning may involve two 
dissociable systems. The studies that have systematically shown these functional characteristics 
have all used the Type X procedure (including CSs and UCSs being matched for perceptual 
similarity) and, as such, in terms of the theoretical interpretation of EC the Type X procedure is the 
most important procedure. If, as we believe, the Type X procedure contains a bias that produces 
conditioning-type effects which may not be association-based then, at the very least, doubt is cast 
upon the evidence that EC is a qualitatively different form of associative learning. The hypothetical 
arguments regarding whether EC is distinct or not from expectancy learning is well documented in 
both Davey (1994) and Baeyens and De Houwer (1995) and there is little to be gained from 
repeating these contrasting views. However, the empirical work presented by Field and Davey 
(1997) does cast new light on the debate in as much as it shows that some of the arguments are no 
longer hypothetical. 
If we accept that the studies listed in support of the functional characteristics of EC and use the 
Type X procedure are prone to the artefact identified by Field and Davey (1997), the important 
issue becomes one of whether other studies, that do not use the Type X procedure, have shown 
evidence that EC is a distinct form of learning. Baeyens et al. would undoubtedly argue that there 
is, but there is evidence that conflicts with this position. Space prevents us from presenting an 
exhaustive literature review (but one can be found in Field, 1997) and so the intention is to critique 
some commonly cited studies and to present some new, less frequently cited, studies that may have 
a bearing on the issue at hand. 
(a) Conditioning Without Contingency Awareness 
The issue of whether contingency awareness is necessary for EC effects to occur is a complex one 
(see Field, 1997). Notwithstanding the criticisms related to the use of the Type X procedure, 
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Baeyens et al. (1990a) have presented the only systematic analysis of contingency awareness in EC. 
Other, frequently cited, studies include: Bierley et al., 1985; Stuart, Shimp and Engle, 1987; 
Krosnick, Betz, Jussim and Lyn, 1992; and De Houwer et al., 1994, 1997. Some comments have 
already been made about these studies, but in terms of contingency awareness, it is worth noting 
some further points. Bierley et al. took only a global measure of awareness (subjects were asked 
whether they could detect a relation between the CS images, the UCS music and their preferences 
for the images) that was perhaps more indicative of demand awareness than specific contingency 
awareness, and also they did not compare their experimental conditions to the non-paired controls. 
As such, their study provides little evidence that the effects observed in the experimental groups 
were significantly different to those in the controls (they ran a CS-only and random control). Stuart 
et al. (1987) also took only global measures of awareness (rather than measuring specific 
contingency awareness). In addition, they missed a very important interaction in their data: the 
effect of awareness did not interact with whether the subject had been in the experimental condition 
or the control condition. So, awareness enhanced conditioning effects in both the experimental and 
control group. This is important when you consider that there is likely to have been an imbalance in 
awareness between the experimental and control conditions (because control subjects are less likely 
to be globally aware of the experimental aim simply because they did not participate in the 
experimental condition). If awareness enhanced conditioning effects in both conditions, and there 
were likely to be more aware subjects in the experimental group than the control, then the lack of 
conditioning effects in the control group might simply have been due to an absence of awareness 
(and awareness in this case was indicative of awareness of the experimental demands) in those 
subjects. As such, this study does not provide compelling evidence that the observed effects were 
associative. 
Finally, Krosnick, Betz, Jussim and Lynn (1992) reported a study on the subliminal conditioning of 
attitudes. They conducted two experiments, both of which used a procedure that was effectively a 
backwards EC paradigm: subjects were presented with a target stimulus preceded by a subliminal 
presentation of either a positive or negative affect-arousing stimulus. Post-test interviews in the first 
experiment indicated that subjects were unaware of the subliminally presented slides. The first 
experiment revealed significant differential responses to the CS between people who had seen the 
positive slides and those who had seen the negative slides. However, the authors had reservations 
about whether subjects were truly unaware of the subliminal slides, and also whether the results 
could be explained by simple mood induction. Experiment two addressed these reservations by 
taking mood measurements after conditioning, and by reducing the length of presentation of the 
subliminal slides. In addition, a different measure of general awareness was taken by asking 
subjects to attend to another set of slides containing subliminal presentations. In this crucial second 
study several affective measures were taken and the overall MANOVA on these scales revealed no 
significant effect of the UCS on the ratings of the CS. 
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Admittedly other studies have measured awareness (e.g. Baeyens et al. 1988 and 1993), but they 
have used correlational analyses that assume that awareness should be linearly related to the 
magnitude of conditioning. It may be that the relationship between awareness and the effects 
obtained is more complex, for example there could be a threshold of awareness beyond which 
responses differ, or the relationship might simply be curvilinear. 
Notwithstanding the argument about how best awareness might be measured (see Shanks and St. 
John, 1994) there are grounds to question the evidence that evaluative learning can occur in the 
absence of contingency awareness. Also relevant is a growing body of recent research that supports 
the position that contingency awareness may be necessary for learning to occur. Shimp, Stuart and 
Engle (1991) reported 21 experiments investigating the conditioning of attitudes towards brands of 
cola. They used an identical paradigm to their earlier study (Stuart et al. 1987), but instead of using 
a fictitious product, they used actual brands of cola. The brand of cola was used as a CS and was 
paired with the same picture UCSs as used by Stuart et al. (1987). Throughout the 21 studies, 
Shimp et al. varied the brand of cola used as the CS and the context within which it was placed (i.e. 
whether known or unknown brands were used as filler stimuli). They also used random control 
groups for comparison. All other aspects of the studies were the same as those used by Stuart et al. 
(1987). In the last 9 experiments, a more refined awareness measure was used, which replaced open 
ended questions with a more systematic method of assessment. So, after the study, subjects selected 
from four brands (the CS brand and three fillers) the brand that always preceded attractive visual 
scenes and stated how confident they were about their decision. Responses were classified as 
contingency aware if the subject selected the correct brand and indicated that they were ‘somewhat 
certain’ or ‘absolutely certain’ of their decision. The first interesting finding was that of the 17 
studies where significant conditioning compared to a control was expected, it occurred in only 10. 
In five of the seven failures, the failure to get conditioning could be attributed to context. More 
interestingly, when the last nine studies were analysed with respect to whether subjects were 
contingency aware or unaware, seven of the studies showed significant conditioning effects in 
subjects classified as contingency aware compared to both those classified as unaware and control 
subjects. The subjects classified as unaware of the contingencies did not respond significantly 
differently to the random control subjects, indicating that conditioning was dependent on 
contingency awareness. Both of the studies where contingency awareness produced no significant 
conditioning effects were ones where a conditioning effect had not been predicted). 
Notwithstanding our reservations about the CS+/CS– paradigm as a means of inferring associative 
learning, Shimp et al. do provide substantial support for the claim that contingency awareness 
might be necessary in establishing EC-type effects. However, this study still says little of whether 
the observed effects were associative in nature. A question arising from this study is whether it was 
contingency awareness that was necessary for the effects observed, or whether demand awareness 
created a conditioning-type effect. A study that specifically addressed the issue of demand 
awareness was conducted by Allen and Janiszewski (1989). They report two experiments: the first 
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used post hoc measures of awareness whereas the second attempted to manipulate awareness. They 
used a true CS+/CS˜ discriminative paradigm with a postexperimental interview to assess whether 
subjects were unaware, contingency aware (i.e. aware that a certain CS word always predicted a 
positive outcome — the UCS), or demand aware (i.e. generally aware that the experimental task 
should influence their positiveness towards the CS word). A CS-only control, where no positive 
feedback (the UCS) was presented, was also used. The results showed a significantly higher 
preference for the CS word in the conditioning group compared to the CS-only control, and that 
preferences for the CS+ were significantly greater than for the CS˜. However, when the groups 
were split according to awareness there was no conditioning effect (in terms of a difference between 
the experimental and control group) in subjects unaware of the contingencies, but significant 
conditioning effects in subjects who were contingency aware or demand aware. In the second 
experiment, Allen and Janiszewski manipulated awareness by changing the instructions given to 
subjects. The results revealed a significant within-group difference between preferences for the CS+ 
word and the CS˜ words in both the contingency-aware and demand-aware groups, but not the 
unaware group. Unfortunately, there was no control group in this second study to verify that the 
effects were due to pairing. These two experiments provide evidence that apparent conditioning was 
dependant on contingency awareness and could be caused by demand awareness (although these 
two concepts overlap considerably). 
Fulcher and Cocks (1997) paired a series of pictures of flowers (CSs) with positive, negative or 
neutrally valenced words (UCSs). Fulcher and Cocks used a slightly different paradigm to the 
standard one used by Baeyens and his colleagues: they used a delay conditioning procedure (where 
the CS onset occurs prior to the UCS onset, with CS and UCS offsets coinciding) rather than a trace 
conditioning paradigm (where CS offset occurs prior to UCS onset). Interestingly, each CS was 
paired with a different valenced word across several conditions, making the procedure a closer 
approximation of a balanced autonomic conditioning paradigm. After conditioning, one group was 
asked to give evaluative ratings of each of the CSs and was then re-presented with each CS and 
asked to recall the word that had followed it. A different group of subjects skipped the rating stage 
and was asked to recall the UCS words immediately after the conditioning procedure. This study 
had two interesting findings: (1) the results indicated that subjects who rated the CSs before recall 
were significantly worse at recalling the UCS words than those who did not showing that 
postconditioning assessments of awareness are likely to underestimate the level of awareness during 
conditioning; and (2) for the group who did the postconditioning evaluative ratings, there was a 
significant interaction between the UCS word recall and the valence of the UCS used — when data 
from the correctly recalled UCSs were removed (i.e. when the contingencies that subjects were 
unaware of were analysed separately), the effect of UCS-valence disappeared. This study shows 
that not only do EC studies that measure awareness underestimate the levels of contingency 
awareness, but also that contingency awareness appears necessary for EC effects to occur. 
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Contrary to current conceptions of EC, there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that 
contingency awareness may have more of a role in establishing EC-type effects than had previously 
been thought. This is interesting in the light of the fact that the only systematic study into the effects 
of contingency awareness was carried out using the Type X procedure — a procedure that is open 
to nonassociative accounts of the results. However, none of these studies in favour of the role of 
awareness indicate that the observed effects are associative. 
(b) Resistance to Extinction 
There is much less of a literature on the apparent resistance to extinction effects found in EC. The 
two main studies to systematically show evidence of resistance to extinction were by Baeyens et al. 
(1988, 1989a) and both of these studies utilised the Type X procedure and so could be prone to the 
type of artefact isolated by Field and Davey (1997). There is other anecdotal evidence for resistance 
to extinction from Levey and Martin (1975) and Martin and Levey (1978), but again these studies 
used the Type X procedure. It is clear then that any systematic attempts to show resistance to 
extinction could be prone to the artefactual, nonassociative effects described by Field and Davey. 
The Use of Between–Group Controls 
As mentioned earlier, Baeyens et al. (this issue) have questioned our belief that between-group 
controls are necessary to infer that learning occurs as a result of specific CS-UCS associations. 
Their argument is that as long as we know that some associations occur within the paradigm, it is 
not necessary to know exactly what associations cause the observed effects. This seems to be where 
our beliefs diverge. Baeyens et al. suggest that we believe that the inclusion of an unpaired control 
is the only design allowing inferences to be made about the associative nature of the observed 
effects, but that ‘this position is hard to defend’ (p. xxx). However, it is no secret that one of the 
main purposes of controlled experimentation is to isolate whatever factor causes an effect to occur. 
John Stuart Mill (1865) described three conditions necessary to infer cause: cause has to precede 
effect, cause and effect must be related, and all other explanations of the cause-effect relationship 
must be ruled out. In terms of whether EC is associative, the first two criteria are met by the within-
subject controls employed within the paradigm. To verify the third criterion, Mill proposed the 
method of agreement which states that an effect is present when the cause is present; the method of 
disagreement which states that when the cause is absent the effect will be absent also and; the 
method of concomitant variation which states that when the above relationships are observed, 
causal inference will be made stronger because most other interpretations of the cause-effect 
relationship will have been ruled out. To sum up, Mill believed that the only way to infer causality 
was through comparison of two situations: one where the cause is present and one where the cause 
is absent. 
The within-subject controls do not meet Mill’s criteria because the N-N control pairings necessarily 
involve a CS-UCS association and so do not represent a situation where the cause is absent. In a 
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counterbalanced design, which is generally agreed to be adequate to infer associative learning, 
Baeyens at al. themselves admit that ‘what a CS+/CS– design does not allow one to conclude is 
whether a CS+_UCS association, a CS–_No-UCS association, or both are responsible for the 
acquired CS+/CS– differentiation, but associative learning of some type necessarily has to be 
involved’ (p.xxx). Thus, the CS+/CS– paradigm represents a situation where there is no comparison 
between stimuli that enter into CS-UCS associations and stimuli that do not. As such, it does not 
meet Mill’s criterion for establishing cause and effect. In short, the CS+/CS– paradigm cannot tell 
us that the observed effects are caused by CS-UCS associations. Even if we accept that associations 
of some sort are involved, they are not necessarily associations between a CS and the UCS that it is 
paired with and if this is so, the effect can hardly be seen as contingency learning, merely learning 
that results from, but is not necessarily caused by, associations between some stimuli that may, or 
may not, have been paired. 
Our next line of reasoning stems from a Popperian view of science. Popper (1959) believed in the 
inherent ambiguity of confirmation and argued that any theory that had stood up to the rigours of 
experimental confirmation could be assigned only the status of ‘yet to be disconfirmed’. He states 
that: 
 ‘just because it is our aim to establish theories as well as we can, we must test them as 
severely as we can; that is, we must try to find fault with them, we must try to falsify them. 
Only if we cannot falsify them despite our best efforts can we say that they have stood up to 
severe tests. This is the reason why the discovery of instances which confirm a theory means 
very little if we have not tried, and failed to discover refutations’ (Popper, 1957: Pp. 133–
134). 
Popper’s belief that falsification is the true means to scientific discovery stems directly from Mill’s 
earlier writings on the isolation of cause. Popper (1957) argues that if two systems which differ in 
one hypothesis only are tested, and experiments refute one system while leaving the second well 
corroborated, only then can we attribute the failure of the first system to that hypothesis in which it 
differs from the other. What we take from these works is that to isolate cause it is necessary to 
compare conditions where the cause is present and where the cause is absent, and that at the very 
least alternative explanations of cause should be placed in direct competition so that one hypothesis 
can be falsified. 
As such, we believe that it is not enough to conclude that EC is associative based only on 
corroborative evidence. Furthermore, we believe that it is invalid to infer a causal relationship 
between CS-UCS associations and changes in the ratings of CSs until such a relationship has been 
compared with a condition that eliminates these associations. Clearly the EC literature has not done 
this because the within-subject controls employed necessarily involve CS-UCS associations and so 
offer no comparison between situations where the cause is present and the cause is absent. In 
addition, the studies often cited as using between-group controls and showing associative EC 
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effects (namely Stuart et al., 1987 and Shimp et al., 1991) provide data that is not as clear-cut 
(certainly in terms of the effect of contingency awareness) as might be, prima facie, believed (see 
earlier comments on these studies). 
What is an Appropriate Control 
Baeyens et al. provide a review of the debate surrounding what would be an appropriate control for 
association. Although Davey (1994) advocated the use of a truly random control procedure, we 
have since accepted Baeyens and De Houwer’s (1995 — See also Baeyens et al. this issue) 
reservations about this paradigm (see Field, 1997). Indeed, these reservations are precisely what has 
lead us to design the Block/Sub-block (BSB) control condition that was used in our conceptual 
conditioning study. Baeyens et al. believe that the random distribution of experimental events is a 
better method than the truly random control — and we agree — and they also believe that the BSB 
control represents an adequate control ‘in principle’. Our reason for using a BSB control in favour 
of any other is that it does provide a situation where the hypothesized cause of EC effects is absent, 
whereas the random distribution of events does not (because CS-UCS associations can still exist). 
Although we accept that in practice that the random distribution of events may differ very little 
from the BSB control, the BSB control does eliminate all CS-UCS associations and so allows 
equivocal conclusions about causality to be drawn (at least according to Mill and Popper’s 
reasoning). 
One further recommendation can be made. The use of a no-treatment control (where subjects are 
not exposed to any conditioning procedure at all) can also control for many things. First, it acts as a 
good gauge of subjects’ expectancies when they come to rerate the stimuli after conditioning. 
Second, it controls for the possibility that effects are due to the stimulus selection procedure 
(because subjects are not exposed to any CSs or UCSs during the conditioning stage of the 
procedure). However, it does not control for the effects of exposure. Although the use of the BSB 
control alone does allow conclusions to be drawn about the associative nature of conditioning, it 
does not allow conclusions to be drawn about the role of presentation. By using both a no-treatment 
condition, and a BSB control condition effects due to exposure to the stimuli can be dissociated 
from effects due directly to the stimulus selection procedure and subjects’ experimental 
expectancies. If conditioning effects are found in the BSB control, then comparison with a no-
treatment condition would be an invaluable way to: (1) ascertain whether repeated exposure to the 
stimuli is causing conditioning effects, or whether it is subject’s expectancies about the 
experiments; and (2) verify that the results found in the BSB control are not simply due to 
conditioning surviving this control procedure. The second point is an important one because 
although the BSB control is a theoretically good control, it is important to compare it with an 
established type of control condition such as the no-treatment control (especially because 
conditioning could not possibly survive in the complete absence of CS-UCS presentations). 
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In sum, it is our belief that to infer that CS-UCS associations cause EC effects, it is necessary to 
compare a condition where CS-UCS associations exist, to one where all CS-UCS associations are 
absent (Mill’s criterion of concomitant variation). The BSB control represents a condition where all 
CS-UCS associations are eliminated, and hence is the condition we advocate as a control for 
association. To show that EC is associative, it is therefore necessary to place the hypothesis that any 
EC effects are caused by CS-UCS associations into direct competition with the hypothesis that the 
effects are caused by non-associative factors. Only through falsification of the latter hypothesis can 
we gain confidence in the former hypothesis. As it stands both hypotheses have corroborative 
evidence and neither has been falsified. 
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